In an effort to overhaul Missouri’s current venue and joinder laws, Missouri lawmakers introduced Senate Bill 7, aimed at restricting non-Missouri plaintiffs from joining their claims in the same lawsuit, with those of a Missouri resident, even though the non-residents’ claims have no legal nexus to Missouri. The most immediate and prominent impact of the bill, if enacted, would be upon mass tort litigation. The bill also limits the use of joinder in product liability cases, prohibiting joining claims arising out of separate purchases or separate incidents related to the same product.
Following its introduction, Senate Bill 7 was revised to adopt the February 13, 2019 Missouri Supreme Court ruling in State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison. The Missouri Senate subsequently passed the revised version on March 4, 2019. The Johnson & Johnson case dealt with the talcum powder litigation filed in St. Louis City Circuit Courts, involving many plaintiffs with both non-Missouri and Missouri residents, and held that plaintiffs cannot use joinder rules to establish venue in a jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.
Proponents of the legislation say that it will help address “a crisis” in Missouri’s courts, where out of state plaintiffs have flocked to litigate their claims in perceived plaintiff-friendly venues, such as St. Louis City (which has been dubbed a “Judicial Hellhole” by the defense bar); and Jackson County, which includes the greater Kansas City area. The Senate bill’s sponsor, Ed Emery, notes that out of the 13,252 mass tort plaintiffs involved in cases being heard in St. Louis City, only 1,035 are Missouri residents.
Proponents of the bill say that its passage will also have significant economic benefits, because Missouri taxpayers are currently paying for out of state plaintiffs to clog the Missouri courts with claims that have nothing to do with Missouri, thus taking up precious judicial resources that would better be used to adjudicate the claims of Missouri citizens. Opponents of Senate Bill 7 primarily argue that it makes sense to have groups of plaintiffs, who all purportedly suffered similar injuries, to bring their claims together in the same court and lawsuit.
The current bill contains “grandfather” provisions, making the legislation inapplicable to any action that meets two criteria: (1) the action is pending as of February 13, 2019 (when the Supreme Court decided Johnson & Johnson), and (2) the action is set for trial on or before August 28, 2019 (the date on which the new legislation is scheduled to take effect.).If enacted, this legislation may significantly alter the landscape of tort litigation in Missouri, both for litigants, and for the judiciary (especially in St. Louis City and Jackson County). Companies that do business in Missouri should follow its progress closely.
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Attorneys: Megan Sterchi Lammert
A Jackson County, Missouri, Circuit Court Judge ordered the City of Raytown - specifically its City Clerk - to pay more than $42,000 in attorney fees and civil penalties after ruling in July 2018 that the city violated Missouri’s Sunshine Law. The City Clerk denied the release of records in an apparent attempt to shield the city from litigation involving the design of one of the city’s intersections.
Several months after Plaintiff Paula Wyrick’s mother died in a vehicle crash at an intersection in Raytown. Wyrick requested records from the City about the intersection, including its design, any traffic or other diagnostic studies conducted there, and any complaints about the safety of or accidents occurring at or around the intersection. On multiple occasions, the City Clerk refused to produce the requested records, asserting all requests fell within the Sunshine Law’s litigation exception. The litigation exception protects, in part, documents related to potential legal actions or litigation involving a public governmental body.
Wyrick filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City Clerk. Wyrick moved for summary judgment asserting that the City Clerk, on behalf of her office, “took a position completely unheard of under Sunshine Law, namely, that a specific category of records can be closed only to Plaintiff and her lawyers, but otherwise open to anyone else. Put another way, the City Clerk has admitted that she would search for and produce records responsive to Paula Wyrick’s requests, if only the requests would come from a different person.”
The City Clerk countered that Wyrick only sought the records to use in potential litigation against the City of Raytown as a result of her mother’s death. In the face of this clear and unequivocal threat of litigation in this matter, the City Clerk argued she was justified in closing and refusing to produce the records.
In July 2018, Jackson County Circuit Court Judge S. Margene Burnett granted Wyrick partial summary judgment and ordered production of the design records and traffic studies conducted at the intersection. She ruled that while Wyrick admitted she was contemplating litigation against the City, the City Clerk’s use of the Sunshine Law as a “shield to hide behind rather than shed light on potentially inappropriate governmental activity…is precisely why the Sunshine Law was enacted.”
Initially, Judge Burnett declined to order civil penalties against the City Clerk, finding that the refusal to comply was done under an incorrect reading of Missouri law. However, the Judge reconsidered in November 2018 after hearing additional arguments, which convinced her that the city clerk’s actions rose to a knowing and purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law. The Clerk had testified that she “implemented a policy to refuse the production of any requested documents to any citizen if that citizen has filed a notice of claim against the City of Raytown, regardless of the nature of the document requested.” The Court awarded $38,550.00 in attorney fees and assessed civil penalties of $4,000.00, representing $1,000.00 for each of the four distinct violations of the Sunshine Law established by the evidence. The City filed a Notice of Appeal on February 14, 2019.
This ruling is likely to encourage municipalities to take a closer look at their open-records policies to ensure they are encouraging the spirit of openness which is embodied in the state’s Sunshine Law.Paula Wyrick v. Teresa M. Henry, in her capacity as City Clerk of the City of Raytown, No. 1716-CV-24321, Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri.
Missouri Court of Appeals Rules Venue Proper Only in County Where Decedent First Ingested Opioid Pain Medication and Not Where Drug PrescribedFebruary 21, 2019 | John Mahon, Jr. and Katie Davies
In State ex rel. Mylan Bertek Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Vincent, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, held that, in a case alleging wrongful death, medical malpractice, and pharmaceutical liability, venue was proper only in the county where the decedent first ingested opioid pain medication, rather than the county where a defendant prescribed it.
Decedent’s widow filed suit in St. Louis County, alleging that defendants’ negligence caused her husband to become addicted to opioid pain medication, leading to unbearable withdrawal symptoms that caused him to commit suicide. The defendants were the physician who prescribed the medication for a back injury and several pharmaceutical companies that manufactured it. The plaintiff alleged the physician defendant first prescribed opioids at his medical office located in St. Louis County and continued to do so over a period of twelve years. Later, while travelling in Florida, the decedent ran out of medication and could not refill it. Plaintiff alleged the decedent suffered intense withdrawal symptoms and, as a result, shot himself in the chest and died.
One of the pharmaceutical company defendants filed a motion to transfer venue asserting that venue was proper only in St. Charles County because that was the county where the decedent lived and first ingested the medication. Plaintiff successfully opposed the motion, arguing that St. Louis County was the proper venue because that was where he was first exposed to the physician defendant’s negligent prescribing practices in his medical office.
The appellate court analyzed § 508.010, RSMo, which sets venue in the county where the plaintiff was “first injured.” Section 508.010.14 provides that a plaintiff is “considered first injured where the trauma or exposure occurred rather than where the symptoms are first manifested.”
The court explained the alleged bodily injury to the decedent – opioid addiction, resulting pain and suffering, and ultimately death – could only have occurred when he ingested the medication. In other words, no bodily injury could have occurred at the time of prescribing, and it was not until the decedent ingested the medication that he exposed his body to the ill-effects of the drug. Under that analysis, venue was proper only in St. Charles County (where decedent first ingested the drug) and not in St. Louis County (where the physician prescribed the drug).
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, issued a writ of prohibition directing the St. Louis County judge not to proceed with the case, and remanded with instructions to transfer to St. Charles County. The court’s analysis demonstrates that: (1) under Missouri venue law, the key inquiry is the location where the injury occurred, rather than where the allegedly negligent conduct occurred; and, (2) the alleged injury and alleged negligence do not necessarily occur in the same location.
The opinion does not reference Section 538.232, which states that, in any action against a health care provider, “the plaintiff shall be considered injured by the health care provider only in the county where the plaintiff first received treatment by a defendant for a medical condition at issue in the case.” It is unclear what effect that section, if discussed, would have had on the court’s analysis.
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