Twitter Google +1 Facebook LinkedIn Share this page RSS

Blogs

Missouri Law Blog Legal updates, news, and commentary from the attorneys of Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC

Missouri Court of Appeals Upholds Acceptance Doctrine to Absolve General Contractor of Premises Liability

April 21, 2017 | John Watt

In the case of Wilson v. Dura-Seal and Stripe, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that the “acceptance doctrine” is still valid law in Missouri, and bars liability against a construction contractor for the injury of a third party after the owner of the premises has accepted the work. Citing prior case law, the Court explained the law as follows: “After an owner accepts a structure, the general rule is that a general contractor is not liable to persons with whom he did not contract....In the absence of formal acceptance, constructive or practical acceptance will suffice....Acceptance of the work is attended by the presumption of the owner … made a reasonably careful inspection of the work, knows of its defects, and so accepts the defects and the negligence that caused them as his own.” 

In Wilson, plaintiff brought suit against general contractor Dura-Seal for injuries she sustained when she tripped and fell in the gutter area of new asphalt, which had been applied by Dura-Seal at a public school.  Wilson claimed that she fell as a result of the height differential between the gutter area and the new asphalt installed by Dura-Seal.  Wilson filed a premises liability claim against the owner of the premises who then in turn added Dura-Seal as a third party defendant.  Dura-Seal moved for summary judgment, stating that the owner had accepted their work and therefore bore the premises liability due to the acceptance doctrine.  The plaintiff argued that there was no evidence that the owner had accepted the work. 

It was undisputed that Dura-Seal had not performed any work on the drive lane for at least two months before the plaintiff’s injury and that the owner had paid Dura-Seal for all of the work.  It was undisputed that the owner also had exclusive possession and use of the premises rather than the contractor.  The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment and found that the undisputed facts showed that Dura-Seal was neither in control of the premises, nor had the right to control the premises at the time of the plaintiff’s injury.

The Court of Appeals also analyzed the “imminently dangerous” exception to the acceptance doctrine.  This exception operates to impose liability on a contractor, even after the owner has accepted the contractor’s work, under the following conditions: “Where the structure was so defectively constructed as to be essentially and imminently dangerous to the safety of others; the defects are so hidden and concealed that a reasonable and careful inspection would not have disclosed them, and these things are known to the defendants but not to those who accepted them.”  Here, the undisputed facts showed that the drive lane and the gutter area where Dura-Seal worked were in plain view and therefore was easily discoverable by the owner.  The Court thus declined to apply the exception, and ruled in Dura-Seal’s favor, holding that plaintiff had accepted the work when it was completed and payment in full was made.

Missouri construction contractors and their counsel should be well aware of the dimensions of the acceptance doctrine, and the “imminently dangerous” exception, when defending cases of this type.

 

The Daubert Standard – Coming Soon to a Missouri Court Near You

March 31, 2017 | John Patterson

Earlier this week, Governor Eric Greitens signed Missouri HB 153 into law. HB 153, which supplants Missouri’s existing expert witness standard with that set forth in Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, 704 and 705, effectively submits expert testimony in most civil and criminal case to the analysis set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Until now, R.S.Mo. 490.065 has set forth the requirements for admission of expert testimony in Missouri state courts.  In its present form, the language of the statute has varied significantly from the familiar expert witness standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the rules of numerous sister states that track the federal rules.  The standard for applying the requirements of R.S.Mo. 490.065 has been nebulously outlined in Missouri case law.  Missouri appellate decisions have noted on occasion that Daubert and its progeny could provide “guidance” where the federal rules and the Missouri rules match up.  See, e.g. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 155-156 (Mo. 2003) (Wolff, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Goddard v. State, 144 S.W.3d 848, 852-853 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004)On other occasions, however, Missouri courts have plainly stated that Daubert did not govern the admissibility of expert testimony in Missouri cases.  See, e.g., McGuire v. Seltsam, 138 S.W.3d 718, at fn. 3 (Mo. 2004). As one Supreme Court Justice noted in a concurrence to McDonagh, supra:

“Forget Frye. Forget Daubert. Read the statute. Section 490.065 is written, conveniently, in English. It has 204 words. Those straightforward statutory words are all you really need to know about the admissibility of expert testimony in civil proceedings. Section 490.065 allows expert opinion testimony where "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact…" McDonagh, supra at 160.

Things have not proven so straightforward, and with no definitive standard, trial judges understandably have had a difficult time sorting the wheat from the chaff, allowing some questionable “expert” testimony to slip through the cracks and into the jury box.  When HB 153 takes effect, in August 2017, and Daubert unquestionably sets the standard for admissible expert testimony, this risk will be considerably lessened. In federal courts, Daubert has for decades proven a fair and effective standard for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.  Its introduction into Missouri law will be a welcome change.

Rule 55.27(a) Means What It Says: Summary Judgment Rules Apply to Motions to Dismiss That Rely on Matters Outside of the Pleadings

March 14, 2017 | Martha Charepoo

In Schnurbusch v. West Plains Regional Animal Shelter et al., after a trial court had dismissed a case for failure to state a claim, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, because the trial court dismissed the case based on evidence outside of the pleadings without having before it a fully developed summary judgment-type record.

Schnurbusch initially arose from claims by a landscaping company and its owners against a city for failing to enforce its zoning laws against an animal shelter and the resulting alleged nuisance. The dispute with the city involved a protracted court battle spanning several years, a jury trial, and an appeal, and the filing of a separate lawsuit against the animal shelter. The parties filed many motions and cross-motions, including a motion to dismiss by the animal shelter which attached three exhibits. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, relying on the exhibits attached to the motion.

The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss their petition arguing that Rule 55.27(a) required that it treat the animal shelter’s motion like a summary judgment motion under Rule 74.04. The Court of Appeals agreed in clear and forceful terms, relying on well-established precedent that once a trial court considers materials outside of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, it automatically gets converted into a motion for summary judgment.  Thus, the trial court erred by failing to compel the parties to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 74.04. The Court of Appeals also reiterated that the procedural requirements of Rule 74.04 are strict and must be followed, which was not done in this case. Here, there was no statement of uncontroverted material facts or legal memorandum explaining why summary judgment should be granted. Indeed, the Court of Appeals found no evidence that the trial court gave the plaintiffs a chance to present additional materials facts to controvert the exhibits presented by the animal shelter. Thus, the Court found there was no Rule 74.04 record for its review, and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings under Rule 74.04.

The lesson of Schnurbusch is clear: the procedure of Rule 55.27(a) for handling a motion to dismiss that brings in matters outside of the pleadings is not discretionary with the trial court, and a trial court’s failure to require the parties to comply with the procedure of Rule 74.04 as stated in that rule will result in reversal.

Subscribe
About Missouri Law Blog

The BSCR Missouri Law Blog examines significant developments, trends and changes in Missouri law on a broad range of topics of interest to Missouri practitioners and attorneys and businesses with disputes subject to Missouri law. Learn more about the editor, David Eisenberg.

DISCLAIMER

The Missouri Law Blog is made available by Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC for educational purposes only as well as to give you general information and a general understanding of the law, not to provide specific legal advice. Your use of this blog site alone creates no attorney client relationship between you and the firm.

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Do not include confidential information in comments or other feedback or messages related to the Missouri Law Blog, as these are neither confidential nor secure methods of communicating with attorneys. The Missouri Law Blog should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a licensed professional attorney in your state.