BSCR has extensive experience representing businesses in the hospitality and leisure industries, bringing its incisive legal judgment to a broad range of issues that our clients encounter. We represents national hotel and fitness chains, amusement parks and entertainment centers, national and regional restaurant chains, taverns, and other local businesses engaged in the hospitality and leisure industries.
Handling claims ranging from pest infestation and service of alcohol to premises liability and product liability, BSCR draws on talent across our firm’s practice groups to successfully defend clients in the hospitality and leisure industries.
Other representative matters include alleged violations of various consumer protection acts, franchising, premises security, and commercial claims. Additionally, our firm defends industry clients in a full complement of employment-related claims, from drafting employer policy manuals and non-compete agreements to wrongful termination disputes and sexual harassment suits.
Our firm has a strong presence within ALFA International’s Hospitality Practice Group, where our attorneys serve on the practice group’s Steering Committee and routinely speak at seminars for in-house counsel of major hotels and other hospitality and leisure clients on key liability issues.
For more information about the services we provide to the Hospitality & Leisure industries contact Shawn Rogers or Marcos Barbosa at 816.471.2121.
| The Missouri Court of Appeals rules that a worker may owe an independent duty of care to a co-worker, which is separate and distinct from her employer’s non-delegable duties.
| A Missouri plaintiff did not irrevocably waive the protections of the work product doctrine simply by designating an expert witness and then withdrawing the designation without disclosing the expert’s analysis or conclusions.
| In McNearney v. LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District recently affirmed a trial court ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant fitness club from claims by the Plaintiff that it was negligent and reckless in allowing her to become injured while participating in a boot camp exercise class.
| On May 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Green v. Brennan in order to resolve a split among the Circuits on whether, in an action for constructive discharge, the 45-day limitation period for the employee to initiate contact with the EEOC begins to run after the employer’s last discriminatory act, or at the time of the employee’s resignation.
| While a Kansas court may grant relief from a final judgment based on excusable neglect, it is an abuse of discretion to grant that relief when the party seeking that relief has failed either to explain what facts constituted excusable neglect or to provide any evidence to support that claim.
| It has long been thegeneral rule in Missouri that for a party to contractually release itself from or limit liability for its own future negligence, the language in the contract must be clear, unequivocal, conspicuous and must explicitly include the word “negligence” or “fault.” However, when the contract is negotiated at arm’s length between “sophisticated commercial entities”, a party can release itself from or limit liability with less precise language.
| The Eighth Circuit recently analyzed the application of the “outside sales” and “administrative” exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act in the context of promotional workers. Also, the Court was asked to decide, for the first time, what constitutes a valid waiver of an employee’s rights under the FLSA.
| An agent may recover attorney’s fees when enforcing a principal’s contract if: the agent is granted the express authority to enforce the contract in the contract itself, the contract contains an attorney’s fees provision, and the agent is the prevailing party.
| A defendant removing a case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act need not provide evidence proving the jurisdictional amount in controversy in the notice of removal. A “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal” is sufficient.
| Individuals and businesses relying upon contractors to provide labor services may be exposing themselves to liability if these contractors fail to pay their employees in accordance with the Missouri Minimum Wage Law.
| K.S.A. 60-19a02 has been amended, increasing Kansas's long-standing cap on non-economic damages (pain and suffering) recoverable in personal injury. K.S.A. 60-456(b) has also been amended to mirror the requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 702.
| Experts are not required to rule out all possible causes when performing the differential etiology analysis if the experts have properly ruled in the alleged cause.
| A Kansas plaintiff may amend their pleadings to assert punitive damages up until the day of the pretrial conference.
| A man who sued his former employer, alleging he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, appealed on the basis that the trial court used a jury instruction with the wrong standard. In a 5-2 decision written by Judge George W. Draper III, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the 'exclusive causation' standard and replaced it with the "contributing factor" standard. On remand and in future cases, the jury must determine whether the plaintiff's filing of a workers' compensation claim was a "contributing factor" to his or her discharge.
| Based on its adoption of a statutory scheme of comparative negligence, Kansas has abolished common law assumption of the risk as a bar to recovery. Simmons v. Porter, 298 Kan. 299, 312 P3d 345, 355 (Kan. 2013).
| The plaintiff has the burden of proving standing, which is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any time.
| In Kansas, the parties bind themselves to an enforceable settlement, even though the parties contemplate subsequent execution of a formal instrument. However, when the parties specifically condition a contract on it being reduced to writing and signed, there is no enforceable contract until such act is accomplished.