The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (“RLLI”) passed in May 2018 after a one-year delay in voting, following strong negative reactions from practitioners, insurers, and states. Indeed, following the release of the 2017 draft, several governors sent letters of protest – Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, South Carolina, Texas and Utah – stating that the ALI was usurping the state legislatures and the RLLI was at odds with their states’ common law.
Although changes were made to that draft, the version that was eventually passed remains extremely policyholder-oriented and not a “restatement” of existing legal principles in any real sense of the word. This is not surprising, as it began as a Principles of Law project – aspirational rather than reflecting settled legal holdings. Following its passage, a number of state legislatures have passed laws or resolutions to prevent the adoption of the RLLI. These include:
- Arkansas (Ark. Code § 23-60-112);
- Indiana (2019 House Concurrent Resolution No. 62);
- Kentucky (2018 Kentucky House Resolution 222);
- Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3032);
- North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 26.1-02 (2019));
- Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code § 3901.82); and
- Tennessee (Tenn. Code § 56-7-102).
Idaho and Texas are currently considering bills to preclude the adoption of the RLLI.
In this series of blog posts regarding provisions of the RLLI, we will examine how it is not a “restatement” of settled common law, but instead adopts minority or even entirely novel principles. The RLLI reflects a profound lack of insight into practical claims handling practices, and in many respects is internally inconsistent or unworkable. We will periodically update these posts as a type of “scorecard,” tracking how various jurisdictions have responded to the RLLI.
Our seventh post considers RLLI’s thoughts on additional insureds and other insurance.
THE RLLI LANGUAGE
§ 20. When Multiple Insurers Have a Duty to Defend
When more than one insurer has the duty to defend a legal action brought against an insured:
(1) The insured may select any of these insurers to provide a defense of the action;
(2) If that insurer refuses to defend or otherwise breaches the duty to defend, the insured may select any of the other insurers that has a duty to defend the action; and
(3) The selected insurer must provide a full defense until the duty to defend is terminated pursuant to § 18 or until another insurer assumes the defense pursuant to subsection (4)(a).
(4) If the policies establish an order of priority of defense obligations among them, or if there is a regular practice in the relevant insurance market that establishes such a priority, that priority will be given effect as follows:
(a) An insurer selected pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) may ask any insurer whose duty to defend is earlier in the order of priority to assume the defense; and
(b) An insurer that incurs defense costs has a right of contribution or indemnity for those costs against any other insurer whose duty to defend is in the same position or earlier in the order of priority.
(5) If neither the policies nor the insurance-market practice establish an order of priority:
(a) The duty to defend is independently and concurrently owed to the insured by each of the insurers;
(b) Any nonselected insurer has the obligation to pay its pro rata share of the reasonable costs of defense of the action and the noncollectible shares of other insurers; and
(c) A selected insurer may seek contribution from any of the other insurers for the costs of defense.
WHY IT IS PROBLEMATIC
It is admittedly not a restatement of the law – Comment a, acknowledges that courts have developed a body of case law regarding “other insurance” clauses and priority of coverage. This is presented as a reimagining of the approach under the common law. The RLLI also suggests that it is necessary to “protect” insureds from having to hire an insurance-coverage expert to determine which insurer to ask for a defense.” Comment a. This is frankly absurd – insureds with multiple potentially-applicable policies routinely tender to carriers for all potentially-triggered policies and leave the carriers to ascertain how the defense is provided. The notion that the insured has, or should be entitled to enforce, any preference as to which policy defends is not well-founded, and certainly not a “restatement” of the state of existing law.
Furthermore, in the additional insured context, the AI is given the option to choose which policy defends. This disregards that the loss risk for general contractors is priced into their policies based upon the expectation that they will, in the ordinary course of business, have additional insured status under subcontractors’ policies that would ordinarily defend. The RLLI approach proposes to usurp the terms of the subcontract agreements, which typically address whether AI coverage is available on a primary, co-primary, or secondary basis, and whether contribution is permitted. These contracts are separate and distinct from the insurance policies at issue, and the RLLI cites no well-established body of case law that would override the enforceable provisions of underlying indemnity agreements.
HOW THE COURTS HAVE REACTED
As of the date of this writing, we have not seen reported decisions addressing § 21 of RLLI.
This concludes our series of blog posts regarding provisions of the RLLI, although we will periodically update the series to provide a “scorecard” of how various jurisdictions have responded to the RLLI. Our prior posts in the series can be found at: