Missouri 2017 Tort Reform Brings Significant Changes to Civil Litigation
Although the 2017 session of the Missouri legislature was not geared to comprehensive tort reform, several key bills were passed that will bring significant changes to civil litigation in Missouri. These include changes to the collateral source rule and evidence of discounted medical bills, the adoption of the Daubert standard, and restraints on insurance bad faith claims.
I. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
On July 5, 2017, Governor Greitens signed Missouri Senate Bill 31, bringing needed changes to the collateral source rule. The collateral source rule generally prohibits a defendant from introducing evidence that part of a plaintiff’s loss was paid for by a party independent of the defendant, such as the plaintiff’s insurer or a public benefits program. Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Mo. banc 2010). However, this rule has been twisted to allow plaintiffs to offer evidence of full-price or “sticker price” medical bills, without regard to contractual adjustments for health insurance or limits on reimbursement established by public payors, on the premise that defendants should not benefit from discounting of the full-price medical bills. The counter-argument, of course, is that plaintiffs are then permitted to recover a windfall that far exceeds both their actual liability for medical care and the costs of health insurance premiums they have paid, and are permitted to present evidence of damages that is merely a legal fiction.
By way of background, older Missouri cases held that, if the evidence establishes that the plaintiff is not liable for payment, medical expenses have not been “incurred,” and plaintiff cannot recover for their value. See Morris v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 46 S.W.170 (Mo. 1898). In the workers’ compensation context, Missouri courts have determined that an employee is not entitled to compensation for healthcare provider write-offs. Mann v. Varney Construction, 23 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. App. 2000) (employee not entitled to compensation for Medicaid write-off amounts when the total amount submitted to Medicaid will never be sought from claimant); accord, Lenzini v. Columbia Foods, 829 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Mo. App. 1992). “Implicit in both decisions is the requirement of actual liability [for the medical bills] on the part of the employee.” Farmer-Cummings v. Personnel Pool of Platte County, 110 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Mo. 2003). However, the Missouri courts have been reluctant to follow this approach outside the realm of workers’ compensation.
As part of the 2005 Missouri tort reform, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.715 was amended to include a new subsection 5 that addressed valuation of the medical expenses, including a provision that there was a rebuttable presumption that the “value” of medical treatment is “the dollar amount necessary to satisfy the financial obligation to the health care provider.” Plaintiffs were not permitted to introduce evidence of medical expenses that exceeded the reasonable “value” of medical care and treatment. See id.
Missouri cases, however, significantly undermined this statutory tort reform, by allowing evidence of “sticker price” bills to get to the jury upon a very low showing of the “reasonableness” of the full-price bills, which can be made by affidavits or the testimony of the health care providers. See Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536 (Mo. banc 2010). The bar to rebut the presumption was so low in practice that the statutory reform failed to have the desired effect.
With the passage of SB 31, laudable carve-outs from the collateral source rule have been made. As to payments by or on behalf of the defendant, the statute used to provide that the defendant could offer evidence that these medical expenses had been paid, but not by whom. The new law clearly provides that, where the defendant or the defendant’s insurer or representative have paid a portion of plaintiff’s medical expenses, these sums are “not recoverable from” the defendant. Although this statute should provide a basis for motions in limine to exclude evidence of medical expenses paid by defendant, the revised statute also provides that, if a claim for these expenses is made at trial, the defendant is entitled to a credit against the judgment.
Critically, SB 31 changes § 490.715’s reference to the “value” of medical expenses, using instead the “actual cost” of medical care and treatment. The “actual cost of the medical care or treatment” is now defined as “a sum of money not to exceed the dollar amounts paid by or on behalf of a plaintiff or a patient whose care is at issue plus any remaining dollar amount necessary to satisfy the financial obligation for medical care or treatment by a health care provider after adjustment for any contractual discounts, price reduction, or write-off by any person or entity.” SB 31 (emphasis added).
II. ADOPTION OF THE DAUBERT STANDARD
House Bill 153, signed by Governor Greitens on March 28, 2017, adopts the Daubert standard for admission of expert opinion testimony. In State Board of Reg. v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. banc 2003), the Missouri Supreme Court held that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065, not Frye or Daubert, controlled the admission of expert opinion testimony in civil cases. The opinion does, however, hold that federal cases applying Daubert are relevant to interpreting the Missouri statute. Citing Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. banc. 1977), the McDonagh Court held that “to the extent that Section 490.065 mirrors FRE 702 and FRE 703 . . . the cases interpreting those federal rules provide relevant and useful guidance.” McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 155.
The Court also noted that Section 490.065 contains language not present in the analogous federal rules of evidence, most particularly Section 490.065.3, which requires that the facts or data on which an expert bases and opinion or inference “must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject” and that these facts and data “must be otherwise reasonably reliable.” Id. at 152-153 (emphasis added). The McDonagh court construed this slight language difference to require an expert in a state court proceeding to establish that the facts and data on which she relied are reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field. The Court contrasted its holding with Daubert’s interpretation of the slightly different language in the federal rule that an expert testifying in federal court need not necessarily identify the relevant scientific community or field in which the data and facts were accepted.
Under the prior standard, “the circuit court is responsible for determining (1) whether the expert is qualified; (2) the expert’s testimony will assist the trier of fact; (3) the expert’s testimony is based upon facts or data that are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field; and (4) the facts or data on which the expert relies are otherwise reasonably reliable.” Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Group, LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Mo. banc 2011). Whether an expert’s opinion is supported by sufficient facts and evidence is a question of law for the Court. Vittengl v. Fox, 967 S.W.2d 269, 280-82 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998).
The amended statute retains the stricter “in the field” language from the prior iteration, requiring that “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” Where the amendment gives the statute teeth is in setting standards for the expert’s methodology.
III. INSURANCE BAD FAITH REFORM
On July 5, 2017, Governor Greitens signed the Senate Substitute for the Senate Committee Substitute for the House Committee Substitute for House Bills 339 and 714, enacting significant insurance bad faith reform. We previously blogged about these bills here.About Missouri Law Blog
Baker Sterchi's Missouri Law Blog examines significant developments, trends and changes in Missouri law on a broad range of topics of interest to Missouri practitioners and attorneys and businesses with disputes subject to Missouri law. Learn more about the editor, David Eisenberg.
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